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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                           
_____________ 
 
No. 08-1534 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
EMORY HICKS, 
 
               Appellant 
_____________ 
       
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania                                                            
District Court  No. 06-cr-00684 
District Judge: The Honorable J. Curtis Joyner                              
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 13, 2012 
 
Before: SCIRICA, RENDELL, and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 17, 2012) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 
Defendant Emory Hicks is appealing the District Court’s denial of his 
motion to suppress physical evidence because the search warrant executed by the 
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police investigators allegedly lacked probable cause and the investigators did not 
act in good faith.  We will affirm.    
I. BACKGROUND 
In the summer of 2006, the Philadelphia police and a task force of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation were searching for Malik Collins, who was wanted 
for, among other offenses, two separate murders in Philadelphia County.  Collins 
was suspected of being a member of a drug distribution organization known as the 
Thompson University Gang (the “Gang”), which was based in the area of 29th and 
Thompson Streets in Philadelphia.  
Philadelphia police detective Leon Lubiejewski, who was assigned to Squad 
10 of the joint Philadelphia police/FBI task force, was responsible for seeking and 
arresting murder fugitives.  On August 23, 2006, Lubiejewski met with FBI agent 
Nick Grill and Philadelphia police detective Rickie Durham, who were both 
assigned to Squad 2 of the task force, to discuss information they had regarding 
Collins. Grill and Durham told Lubiejewski that on approximately August 17, 
2006, a reliable, confidential informant (the “Informant”) saw Collins on a porch 
outside of a building at a specified address in Philadelphia (the “Building”), and 
that according to the Informant, Collins was presently hiding inside an apartment 
in the Building.  The Building had two separate apartments, one on the first floor 
and another on the second floor, accessed by separate doors that open onto a shared 
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porch.  Durham said that the Informant learned from another person (the 
“Secondhand Informant”) that Collins entered the first floor apartment at the 
Building and that guns were present in that apartment.1
Following the meeting, Lubiejewski began drafting an affidavit in support of 
a warrant to search the Building’s first floor apartment.  Lubiejewski consulted 
with Assistant District Attorney Ann Ponterio regarding his draft affidavit, and she 
advised him to obtain additional information regarding the Informant’s reliability.  
Lubiejewski contacted task force members regarding the Informant’s reliability, 
and he was told that the Informant provided information that led to the arrest of a 
fugitive and that the Informant had also been supplying information regarding the 
Gang, including the names of Gang members and the methods of its operations.     
  At the time of the meeting 
on August 23, 2006, Lubiejewski believed that the Informant, not the Secondhand 
Informant, saw Collins enter the first floor apartment.   
Task force members also conducted surveillance of the Building.  On 
August 24, 2006, Sergeant Gerald Grdinich, on two occasions, saw the same black 
male exit the Building’s first-floor apartment, stand on the porch for a short time, 
and then return to the apartment.  Grdinich was not able to identify the man but 
knew that he was not Collins.2
In the afternoon of August 24, 2006, Lubiejewski completed the affidavit in 
 
                                                 
1 Lubiejewski did not know the identity or reliability of the Secondhand Informant.   
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support of his application for a search warrant of the Building’s first-floor 
apartment and presented it to a bail commissioner.  This affidavit stated, in 
pertinent part, that: 
On Wednesday, August 23, 2006, [Lubiejewski] met with members of 
the FBI drug enforcement task force who related that they have a 
reliable informant who advised them that he knows Malik Collins and 
that Collins is presently hiding inside of [the Building].  The 
informant relates that he was present on Thursday 8/17/2006 outside 
of [the Building] and saw the fugitive Malik Collins, standing on the 
front porch of that location for a short period of time and then enter 
the first floor apartment of that duplex through a door on the front 
porch that is at the eastern end of the porch.  The informant has also 
spoken to an individual who has on-going contact with Malik Collins 
at this location and this person has said that there are a number of 
guns being stored inside that apartment.  (contd) 
         
The informant has given information in the last month that has led to 
the arrest of a fugitive inside of a location, who was wanted on an 
active arrest warrant.  The informant has admitted to being a member 
of the 29th and Thompson Sts. drug organization and has been 
supplying Federal agents with the names of individuals belonging to 
the organization, locations used by the organization and methods of 
operation of the organization. 
 
* * * 
 
Members of the Philadelphia Police Department and the FBI 
conducted a joint surveillance of [the Building] beginning on the 
evening of 8/23/06 thru the afternoon of 8/24/06, and during that 
period of time, a [black male] was observed twice, looking out of the 
front door, looking in both ways up and down the street and going 
back inside. 
 
(emphasis added).  Lubiejewski never asked Grill or Durham to review his 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 This man was later determined to be Hicks.   
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affidavit for accuracy prior to presenting it to the bail commissioner.  The bail 
commissioner found probable cause for the search and issued the warrant. 
 On August 25, 2006, police officers and FBI agents executed the search 
warrant at the Building’s first-floor apartment and found:  three stolen handguns 
(two of which were loaded); an assortment of loaded magazines and loose rounds, 
a bulletproof vest; and drug paraphernalia.  Hicks, who was the only person present 
in the apartment, was arrested and indicted on two counts:  possession of a firearm 
after a prior felony conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e); 
and possession of body armor after a conviction for a prior crime of violence in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 931 and 924(a)(7). 
 Hicks filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence found during the 
execution of the search warrant.  Hicks argued that the search warrant was not 
supported by probable cause and the investigators did not rely on the warrant in 
good faith.  The District Court held a hearing on the motion.  Lubiejewski testified 
that, at the time he presented his affidavit to the bail commissioner, he believed 
that all of the information in his affidavit was fair and accurate.     
Lubiejewski further testified that he later learned that his affidavit contained 
two incorrect statements.  First, although the Informant did see Collins on the 
porch in front of the Building, he did not witness which apartment door Collins 
entered.  Instead, it was the Secondhand Informant that saw Collins enter the 
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Building’s first-floor apartment, and the Informant learned this information from 
the Secondhand Informant.  Lubiejewski explained that the error occurred because 
he misunderstood the information relayed by Grill and Durham.  Second, 
Lubiejewski’s affidavit incorrectly stated that the Informant admitted to being a 
member of the Gang.  Lubiejewski testified that the error was based on his false 
assumption that the Informant’s familiarity with the Gang’s members and 
operations must have been the result of his status as a member of the Gang.   
After a hearing on the motion, the District Court held that the search warrant 
lacked probable cause but that the evidence was not subject to suppression because 
the investigators acted in good faith.  Hicks was tried before a jury and convicted 
on both counts.  Hicks appealed the denial of his suppression motion.3
II. DISCUSSION 
  
A. PROBABLE CAUSE 
The government argues that Lubiejewski’s affidavit contained sufficient 
probable cause to support the warrant even after excising the two false statements, 
and that the District Court erred in holding to the contrary.  A district court’s 
findings of fact on a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error, and its 
application of the law to the facts is subject to plenary review.  United States v. 
                                                 
3 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 146 n.15 (3d Cir. 2006).   
The task of a court in issuing a search warrant is to “make a practical, 
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons 
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 238 (1983); see also United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289, 296 (3d Cir. 
2000).  The duty of courts reviewing the issuance of a search warrant is to 
determine whether the issuing court had a “substantial basis” for concluding that 
probable cause existed for the search.  Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39; see also Whitner, 
219 F.3d at 296. 
The District Court did not err in concluding that, given the false statements 
in the affidavit, there was no substantial basis for determining that probable cause 
existed.  Lubiejewski’s affidavit, after excising the false statements, essentially 
states that, six days earlier, the Informant saw Collins standing outside of the 
Building, but that he did not witness which of the Building’s two apartments 
Collins entered.  Only the Secondhand Informant provided information stating that 
Collins entered the first-floor apartment and that Collins stored guns inside that 
apartment.  The only indicium of reliability for the information provided by the 
Secondhand Informant is that this person allegedly has “on-going contact” with 
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Collins.  Lubiejewski’s excised affidavit, considered in its totality, does not 
provide a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed for the search 
of the Building’s first-floor apartment.   
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in holding that the warrant was 
not supported by probable cause. 
B. GOOD FAITH 
 Hicks asserts that the false statements in Lubiejewski’s warrant affidavit 
were made with reckless disregard for the truth, and that consequently, the District 
Court erred by applying the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.  A 
district court’s determination regarding whether a false statement in a warrant 
affidavit was made with reckless disregard for the truth is subject to a clear error 
standard.  United States v. Brown, 631 F.3d 638, 642 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 Generally, where law enforcement officers objectively rely on a warrant in 
good faith, courts will not apply the exclusionary rule or otherwise suppress 
evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (holding that evidence need not be suppressed 
where officers objectively and reasonably relied on a subsequently invalidated 
search warrant); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147-48 (2009) (finding 
that the exclusionary rule does not apply where an unlawful search is caused by 
isolated negligence that was not in reckless disregard of the Constitution).   
9 
 
A law enforcement officer who knowingly or recklessly provides false 
information in support of a probable cause affidavit does not act in good faith and 
that officer’s reliance on any warrant issued based on such false information is not 
reasonable.  See, e.g., United States v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred 
Twenty-Two Dollars and Fifty-Seven Cents, 307 F.3d 137, 146 (3d Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Williams, 3 F.3d 69, 74 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993).  A statement is made 
with a reckless disregard for the truth when “viewing all the evidence, the affiant 
must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had 
obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.”  Wilson v. 
Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 The District Court did not clearly err in determining that the law 
enforcement officers acted without recklessness. Lubiejewski testified that the 
errors were the result of a miscommunication with Grill and Durham, and that he 
believed the information in his affidavit was true and accurate at the time that it 
was presented to the bail commissioner.  Lubiejewski consulted with an assistant 
district attorney on several occasions regarding the sufficiency of his affidavit, and 
he sought to confirm the information in his affidavit by requesting surveillance of 
the Building.  Consequently, the District Court did not clearly err in determining 
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that the officers acted without recklessness.4
Accordingly, we will affirm. 
      
 
                                                 
4 Hicks also contends that the officers did not act with good faith because 
Lubiejewski’s affidavit was allegedly so facially inadequate that a finding of 
probable cause was unreasonable.  See, e.g., Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred 
Twenty-Two Dollars and Fifty-Seven Cents, 307 F.3d at 146.  We disagree.  On its 
face, Lubiejewski’s affidavit was based on information from the Informant, who 
was familiar with the operations of the Gang and who had provided reliable 
information in the past.  The affidavit further stated that the Informant believed 
Collins was presently hiding in the Building and that the Informant witnessed 
Collins enter the first-floor apartment.   Thus, Lubiejewski’s affidavit, on its face, 
was not so facially inadequate that a finding of probable cause was unreasonable. 
